NSF Grant : The Dynamics of Rules in Commons Dilemmas

This project will contribute to the methodological development of agent-based models by combining laboratory and field experiments, and role games, and to the empirical testing of alternative behavioral models. It may have a broad impact in political science and ecosystem governance by deriving an understanding of what factors affect the ability of resource users to change institutional rules effectively.

Date de début de projet :

01/01/2005

Date de fin du projet :

30/11/2009

Objectifs

This project aims to study what causes individuals to invest in rule development, and which cognitive processes explain the ability of humans to craft new rules.

Localisation

Colombie
Thailande
USA 

Description

Various social sciences have contributed to understanding how humans make decisions in a given rule set of experimental games, such as social dilemmas, coordination, and bargaining. However, the rules of the games are not fixed in real-life settings. Not many systematic studies have been performed on the question of how humans are able to change the rules in commons dilemmas. From field studies it is well known that people invest significant effort in crafting new rules. The main research plan consists of three components: laboratory experiments, experiments in the field, and agent-based models.

Partenaires

Universidad Los Andes, Columbia
Arizona State University
Chulalonkkorn University

Equipe

F. Bousquet

Financement

NSF